M. KAPLAN DIARIES – TRANSCRIPTION

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in education and politics.

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Sunday, August 4, 1940

Reflective mysticism, as distinguished from theurgic, is a state of mind in which one experiences not only a sense of self-fulfillment but the feeling that such self-fulfillment is en rapport with a larger reality than one's self. It becomes religious mysticism when that larger reality is identified as God or the Power that has made possible this self-fulfillment.

Religious philosophy as a rule concerns itself with the larger reality, or God, independently of the total experience in which His presence is felt. It tries to fit the idea of God, thus abstracted from its matrix, into the frame of the logical categories of being and knowing with which we operate in metaphysics and epistemology. The sterility of its efforts should be a warning against expecting any yield from the most concentrated study of the idea of God, from the standpoint of His existence and manner of functioning. Neither God's existence nor functioning can have any more meaning than the existence and functioning of a sovereign apart from the people over which he exercises his sovereignty.

Ethics, on the other hand, seeks to establish the basis for ethical action on some autonomous principle like happiness, intuition, utility or categorical imperative. The autonomy is in antithesis to the heteronomy of the ethical precepts taught by authoritative religion. Historically the purpose of ethical science has been to build up a system of ethical conduct that would be based on human experience or reason and would not have to depend on the authority of supernatural revelation or organized religion. The need for such systems of autonomous ethics is felt whenever the supernatural revelation is

called into question. The danger of socail anarchy or of remaining without a dependable standard of human behavior, it is believed, might be prevented by means of autonomous system of ethics. In France instruction in autonomous ethics was part of the educational system. It is probably possible to develop a series of rules for human behavior in various situations and relationship as it is possible to work out traffic rules. So long as there are authorities and sanctions to back them up they are likely to be obeyed. They would be autonomous in the sense that they are not imposed by a supernatural agency or any one speaking in the name of such agency. They would be as autonomous as any legislation of a self-governing society would be. But that would practically assimilate ethics to legislation. It would cease to be autonomous in the sense of expressing the innermost self of the individual and of representing his own free conviction.

Why indeed may not ethics be merely a traffic code upon which the members of society agree to act in order to avoid collissions and to make sure that each one gets to his destination, so to speak, with a minimum of inconvenience? As a matter of fact we might have gotten much further with working out the actual necessary rules of the road -- or of the way of life -- if we had been more concerned with practical outcomes in terms of peace and social security and less with questions of rationale and sanction and abstract problems about values, etc. But the truth is that even ordinary traffic coes, in the literal sense of the term, to say nothing of constructive social legislation, presuppose the existence of an ethical code, in the same way as mathematics both simple and comples presupposes an inherent logic of mathematics. It is ethics as the basis of all social efforts which find expression in actual codes of morals and laws that is the subject matter of the science of ethics. The autonomy which that

science seeks to establish is not merely the kind that belongs to social legislation, but that is at the very basis of individual behavior. In other words, in the science of ethics we seek to identify that in the individual mind which enables him of his own accord to subordinate his impulses and desires to a more inclusive will.

Throughout the past the human being conceived that will as the will of God or gods who transcended him in power and in ethical qualities. Nothing would have seemed more absurd than to claim for oneself the motivation to ethical conduct. The ancients may have gone too far in their ascribing that motivation to an extraneous agency. But it is questionable whether the moderns have been able to work out a consistent theory of ethical conduct on the basis of entirely individual motivation. The reason probably is that in attempting to work out a theory of ethics on such a basis they were as guilty in their way as the religious philosophers were in theirs. The religious philosophers have made the mistake of treating the idea of God apart from its context which includes the idea of man. Likewise the ethicists have erred in treating the idea of man apart from its context which included the idea of God.

Both of these mistakes point to the need of formulating the science of soterics in which both the idea of God and the idea of man would be dealt with in relation to their context. It would be a synthesis of religious philosophy and ethics, because the will to live the life abundant is the meeting point of human personality and the Power that makes for its salvation.

Another reason it would be wrong to treat ethics as a kind of social legislation is that such a treatment of ethics would necessarily overlook the creative aspect when it functions as a protest against or as criticism of prevailing standards. The prophet or even

the social reformer does not merely denounce the failure of society to live up to its professed standards. He often attacks the existing standard. Oppression, slavery and false dealings in their various forms are as a rule permitted by the legal codes, and it is the legal codes that are attacked. What is recognized as law today was at one time the ethical principle of the few and what is today the ethical principle of the few will one day become law. The hope of mankind is therefore with the select few who have the courage and the tenacity to withstand the onward sweep of prevalent standards of right and wrong, and to set up their own ideal. But if they are to succeed they must be permitted to remain solitary. All in whom there is an extra portion of the spirit should cultivate it in order to join the small troop that rallies about these prophets and helps them keep their ideals afalme. If they can no longer be inspired by traditional religion or guided by its precepts in carrying out this mission, they need a discipline that will meet their spiritual needs. That discipline should ~~xxxx~~ avail itself of what has been learned both by the science of ethics and the philosophy of religion, and seek to gain a deeper insight into the way the various religions of mankind have functioned. Such a discipline would make its objective the understanding of all the elements of human experience, religious mysticism and social idealism that enter into man's striving for the life abundant, as well as the mistaken assumptions, strange aberrations and rationalizations of all kinds of egoisms. The discipline which the modern man needs is soterics.

It is only soterics that explains mysticism without explaining it away. By directing our attention to our own will to live with all its human complications it brings us face to face with the Ultimate. We stand in its presence but we cannot penetrate it. But the mere awareness of it gives us new energy and zest for living. The testi-

mony with regard to reflective mysticism on the part of such thinkers as Bertrand Russell and Leuba whose attitude toward traditional religion and its God-Providence concept is entirely negative deserves serious consideration. According to Bertrand Russell mysticism is "the inspirer of whatever is best in man" (Mysticism and Logic, p.4) and according to Leuba "Whoever wants to know the deepest that is in man, the hidden forces that drive him onward, should become a student of mysticism. And if knowing man is not knowing God, it is nevertheless only when in possession of an adequate knowledge of man that metaphysics may expect to fashion an acceptable conception of the Ultimate." (The Psych. of Rel. Mysticism p. 318) (Both quotations are from E. W. Lyman's chapt. on Rel. & Mysticism in his "The Meaning and Truth of Religion).

The adequate knowledge of man to which Leuba refers would necessarily be that knowledge of man which in addition to knowing all the chemical, biological and psychological facts about him would also know him as a totality both individually and collectively enacting history striving to make the most of life and the center of the cosmos the creator and upholder of which he has always conceived as the Power making for his salvation.

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Monday, Augst 5, 1940

The contention of Dewey in his REconstruction in Philosophy is that Greek philosophy and Christian theology were on the wrong track in that they cultivated the "spectator conception of knowledge." He urges instead the cultivation of a conception of knowledge as a means of transforming the world. Knowledge should be practical and not contemplative and deal with means, ends and values. The significance of his contention is lost, if it is regarded merely as presenting an alternative conception of knowledge or truth as such. Lyman, e.g. misses that significance when he contrasts Dewey's approach to that

of Bertrand Russell whom he quotes (The Meaning and Truth of Religion,p.175) as saying that "the asceticism of the intellect requires that, while we are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, we shall repress all other desires for the sake of the desire to know." (Philosopy pp. 225, 300). The fact is, whether Dewey himself recognizes it or not, that what Dewey is advocating is the surrender of a conception of salvation that has long held sway, and the adoption of the emergent conception. Greek philosophy and its offshoot Christian theology held "the spectator conception of knowledge" not for any theoretical reason pertaining to the nature of knowledge as such but as a corrollary of their notion of salvation. They correctly assumed that salvation or the life abundant necessarily meant the maximum development of that which differentiated the human from the subhuman. But they erred in assuming that the differentia was confined to man's intellectual or contemplative power. Hence they were just as pragmatic as Dewey was from his point of view in maintaining that the cultivation of the spectator conception of knowledge contributed to man's self-fulfillment.

Dewey, on the other hand, finds that the maximum life for the human being is not in merely using his intellectual powers and contemplating the world, but in actually transforming the world. Therein does man differ from the subhuman, and therein does he attain the maximum of life. It would never have occurred to Dewey or to any other philosopher to suggest the power of transforming life as the human differentia and its exercise as constituting salvation if man had not actually done much in the way of transforming the world. The same applies to the Greek philosophers. If they had not acquired the power to abstract and generalize and reflect on their achievements in thinking they could not have made the contemplative life synonimous

with life abundant. In other words, we cannot tell beforehand what constitutes life abundant unless we have had a foretaste of it. But having once had such a foretaste we can with difficulty be crowded back to our earlier confines. This is what Dewey is pleading for, not to be content with contemplating the world when we have it in our power to transform it.

That does not mean that everytime we study any problem we must at once see it in its relation to the power of transforming the world. On the contrary it is often necessary to exercise exactly what Bertrand Russell describes as "the asceticism of the intellect," by steeping ourselves in that problem as though its solution were an end in itself, for the sake of which we are willing to forego eating and drinking and even the happiness of transforming the world. As Russell so well puts it, to "repress all other desires for the sake of the desire to know." Dewey would probably be the last person in the world to deprecate such intellectual asceticism.

Thus in the light of the principle of salvation we can understand more clearly what is at stake between the intellectualists and the pragmatists perhaps better than they do themselves.

How do we arrive at the principle that every normal human being possesses inherent worth and that his personality is sacred and dare not be violated by being used only as a means instead of being an end in itself? Or the principle that nothing must stand in the way of maximum cooperation among the members of any group or among the groups themselves? These principles evidently do not derive from our individual desires and interests, since they are in fact set up to counteract the latter, where do they come from? The answer usually given is that they constitute "intuitions of the good." But as mere intuitions they do not point beyond themselves and seem to hang in a vacuum. The human mind finds it difficult to accept any abstract or

general principle, unless that principle be traced to some immediately experienced will or reality. For this reason, instead of categorically affirming the principles of self-determination and cooperation as universally applicable, and declaring those principles intuitions of the good, we shall get much farther with having them accepted and acted upon, if we show how they follow necessarily from the basic will to live the life abundant. Since we are to think of salvation in mundane terms its attainment without social cooperation is inconceivable. But if social cooperation is to yield the maximum good in the way of transforming the world, it is equally evident that such good is most likely to result when the individuals composing society are free to express the fullest possibilities for good that they possess.

"The essential question," says H.F. Ward (Which Way Religion?, p. 36-42) about cosmic energy is whether it is on the side of or indifferent to the achievement of a moral order?" Suppose that instead of the achievement of moral order" we said "the will to live"? Is it necessary to know whether cosmic energy is on the side of or indifferent to the will to live in order to exert that will? From a purely theoretical point of view we are justified in assuming that since the will to live is itself part of the cosmic energy, the latter is on the side of the will to live. The fact that in the individual living being the time comes when that will perishes would not constitute proof that the cosmic energy is opposed or indifferent to the will to live as such so long as the conditions warranting it exist. The same applies to the destruction of life caused by some accident or by an enemy. The factor of chance or of incongruity in the operation of the will to live cannot by itself be adduced as proof of indifference on the part of cosmic energy to the will to live.

The same reasoning applies to the will to live the life abundant. Its existence is sufficient evidence that cosmic energy is on the side of man's striving for salvation. Since the moral order merely means the system of human relationships which are the outgrowth of man's striving for salvation, it is self-contradictory to describe the cosmic order as indifferent to the moral order. The simple logic of this reasoning should have forestalled the conception of the universe as mechanistic. Even if it were to be regarded as mechanistic insofar as it is assumed to be inanimate, it could not be considered such in that part of it which was animate. Moreover, since the animate part of the cosmos must in some way be related integrally to the inanimate, we may be certain that cosmic energy is on the side of life in general and of maximum life for man in particular. (This is in a sense the ontological argument advanced above.)

To take the position that religion depends for its validity upon a cosmology which calls for a conception of God is to misapprehend the function of religion and its relation to cosmologies. In ancient religion there were two types of cosmology, one which, like the cosmology in Genesis, was the attempt to achieve an orientation from the standpoint of the will to salvation, and the other was the product of the desire to achieve a kind of scientific orientation, for the purpose of knowing how to work magic. The latter kind of cosmology which developed independently of the problem of salvation has its modern representative in such theories about the universe as one meets with in Eddington, Whitehead, etc. The former kind of cosmology which was a correlative of the problem of salvation has been adumbrated by Kant, the Ritschlians, etc. Those who still identify salvation with the contemplative life and with the attainment of absolute truth are inclined to regard as essential a cosmology arrived at independently of any soteric interests and one that inherently demands that the

existence of God be posited. Those, on the other hand, who view salvation as synonimous with making the most of life in its various aspects are inclined to be content with a cosmology which is a correlative of the conception of salvation.

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We are only deluding ourselves if we imagine that it is possible for the human mind to contemplate metaphysical ultimates from a standpoint outside itself. Whatever we conclude concerning those ultimates is entirely determined by the categories of our thinking and by the application of that thinking to derivatives. Whether we believe in the existence of God or not, whether, if we do believe in His existence, we ascribe to Him creativity or finalism, perfection or evolution, we simply project into the cosmos (which is itself a mental construct) the conclusions formed in our minds. Especially when we consider God bound by the ultimate principles of reason and value, we definitely use our own mind as the source of our inferences concerning God. By this I do not mean to imply that such inferences have no ontological significance. If we are prepared to assume that the human mind is not inherently conditioned to falsify ontological reality, but on the contrary is capable if carefully exercised, to give us at least a glimpse, if not a complete insight into being, then we may accept its testimony with regard to ultimate reality. But what I do mean to imply is that the mind itself is inherently conditioned to think in accordance with what it regards as making for its own maximum life. The ultimates of reason and value are none other than the categories of the mind. All of which brings us back to the same point that even the most abstract metaphysics is rooted in the will to live the maximum or the good life.

If that is the case, it would seem that we could not very well avoid metaphysical and ontological problems, since their purpose is

to help us arrive at a coherent theory of salvation, a theory that would give our salvation an intelligible cosmic setting. There can be no question that the study of metaphysics and the contemplation of ultimates are to those who have a bent for them an enhancement of life, as music and art are for those who are ethically minded. But that does not mean that in order to achieve salvation one must engage in metaphysical thinking. We certainly would not want anybody to regard the mere verbal assent to statements concerning the ultimate nature of God as essential to salvation. But if verbal assent is not enough, then he must actually engage in the study of metaphysics. That is an unreasonable demand, because it is an infeasable one, in the case of the overwhelming majority of people. We do not want to bring back such scenes as were enacted when people broke one another's heads over the issue whether the Son was omoonsion or omoriousion with the Father. The question which should engage us is just how much metaphysics has it become essential for the average person to know from the standpoint of his achieving the life abundant? It seems to me that a full awareness of our striving for salvation and of its main implications, especially as it points to the interpretation of the cosmos as divine ought to be quite sufficient for the average person. That of course would include clearing his mind of all those misconceptions concerning religion or the idea of God which stand in the way of coherent thinking about physical and human nature and about human history.

All so called metaphysical validation of the belief in God is generally merely interpreting reality in line with that belief as it emerges from the will to salvation. In recent cosmology there has been much talk of the principles of indeterminary and creative evolution which implies spontaneity and variation. Alongside these principles there is posited the process of increasing unification,

coordination and organization. Synthesizing the former with the latter in the principle of creative finalism, we seem to behold in the cosmos the verification of the God idea of religion. But actually what we do is to report the findings of our analystic introspection into the workings of our own selfhood. These findin s we then project into the cosmos. It would not occur to us to interpret our observations of indeterminacy in the physical sciences as an affirmative support of the God-idea, if we were not interested in validating the experience of inner freedom and sense of responsibility which points to a Power not ourselves that makes for our self-fulfillment through such experience. Likewise we would not be interested in the process of increasing organization or in creative finalism as an aspect of being that verifies the belief in God, unless we first experienced either process as issuing both in our own self-fulfillment and in the belief in the Power making for our self-fulfillment. Without first formulating our conception of God on the basis of our experience of selfhood as it expresses itself in the will to salvation, whatever we find to be the case in nature is of neutral significance, as far as the belief in God is concerned. We might then interpret the indeterminacy in nature as blind chance, or the increasing organization either as inevitable fate or as subjective interpretation due to the nature of thought. "Any one who can at all catch the drift of experience -- moral no less than physical -- must feel that mechanism rules the world," wrote Santayana (Reason in Science, p.76).

The demand for metaphysical validation of the belief in God stems from Greek philosophy. The Jews have taught the world to demand a historical validation. It is thus that they have come to give the world not a philosophy of nature but a philosophy of history.

To prove the existence of God, the Jews pointed to their own history. They cast their traditions and annals into a coherent account not of any abstract ideas or trends but of God's way with man. They set that account into the framework of a cosmogony and ethnology. The growing danger of invasion, exile and destruction and the actual impact of national calamities crystallized that philosophy of history. But in crystallizing it, they also rendered it highly particularistic and Israelocentric. During the latter part of the second commonwealth period Judaism was on the point of becoming universalized. All who wanted to join the Jewish people were welcomed, and national expansion took the form of proselytism. But that did not alter the Jewish philosophy of history. It still remained particularistic in that it centered about the Jewish people.

By the same token Christianity which took over the Jewish philosophy of history did not, in spite of appearance, transform the particularistic character of that history. The Church regarded itself as the true Israel, and applied to itself all the prophecies which gave meaning to Jewish history. The Church regarded itself as the chosen people for the sake of which the world had been created. The fact that it was ready to admit all who wanted to enter it, and even engaged in proselyting efforts does not in the least modify the particularism of its philosophy of history. The Jews for at least two centrues before Christianity (especially in Alexandria) and even during the early centuries of Christianity were just as anxious to have the rest of the world accept their religion.

The notion of a universal history of philosophy that would validate the belief in God was first broached in modern times and actually attempted by Hegel. But unfortunately the attempt miscarried because it ended up in being just as particularistic as was

the traditional philosophy of history. While Hegel did include in his construction of history a number of nations and cultures, he ignored far too many and finally led up to two conclusions which vitiated his entire attempt. One is the acceptance of the status quo as the consummation of history, and the Prussian state as the highest embodiment of Reason or God. What Hegel thus achieved was to formulate a new particularistic philosophy of history centering about Prussia in place of the traditional one which centered about Israel or the Church.

There have since appeared other philosophies of history, notably those of Marx, H. S. Chamberlain (Foundations of the Nineteenth Century), J. R. Bury (The Idea of Progress) and Spengler (The Decline of the West). But they were not intended to validate the belief in God. On the contrary, some like Marx's and Spengler's even meant to refute the belief in God. It is quite certain that no one with a sense of reality will again attempt to formulate a philosophy of history in which any one people or group of peoples will be able to figure as incarnating the meaning of God or carrying forward any of the purposes associated with godhood. The only possibility of having recourse to history as a means of illustrating the functioning of the Power that makes for salvation is to treat mankind as a whole from the standpoint of progress in general (along the lines of "Morals in Evolution by L. T. Hobhouse) and from the standpoint of the ultimate realization of the unity of mankind.

The case with historical validation of the belief in God is entirely different from that with metaphysical validation. The facts of nature do not of themselves indicate whether nature is on the side of or indifferent to the achievement of a moral order. The moral order has to be assumed and then, if we think consistently, we are compelled to regard it as in some way part of the natural order.

In the case of historical validation, however, the very awareness of the difference between a less abundant and more abundant life presupposes a historic process which has not only augmented the opportunities for living life more abundantly but which also has contributed to the growth of awareness of the difference between the two kinds of life. The awareness of that difference is itself the product of a process that makes for salvation. That process is history, and history understood thus reveals a Power not ourselves that makes for salvation. The human career, though closely bound up with nature necessarily has something to it that is a plus. This plus is unique. The plus which is the human differentia conceivably may be a departure from, even a revolt against, non-human nature. But history is only another name for the human career itself. If the human career taken generically can show nothing to indicate a power making for, i.e. progressively increasing, the abundance of life and the chances of its being attained by an ever larger number of human beings, the abundance of life and the chances of its being attained by an ever larger number of human beings, what would be the sense of affirming the existence of a Power that makes for salvation?

Hence no fully developed religious conception of God is really possible without a philosophy of history. Since this philosophy will have to be universal it will have to indicate those trends in the history of mankind -- economic, social, religious, scientific and philosophical -- which have contributed toward,as Hobhouse points out, the growth of humanity in the sense of"a certain quality that is in each man, "and in the sense of "the whole race of man." Put differently, we have to learn to read history as an account of the progress of the recognition of the worth of human personality in the individual and of the unity of mankind as indispensable to the salvation both individual and collective. Such a history would have to include the

account of the obstacles encountered and the occasional defeats and setbacks experienced. The career of mankind can be nothing other than the career of the individuals and groups composing it. Such a history would not merely validate the belief in God; it would actually set it forth in concrete terms.

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Wednesday, August 7, 1940

In such a philosophy of history there should be room for the contribution both to the problem of salvation and to its solution by individuals and groups. The individuals would be prophets, philosophers, scientists, inventors, adventurers, social reformers. The groups would be nations, churches, sects, orders, revolutionary societies, etc. Each nation or church that wants to be a factor for salvation would naturally explore the possibilities that inhere in its own civilization and tradition. It should even maintain that for its own members the realization of those possibilities is both an indispensable and most effective means of their salvation. But no nation or church should not make the fatal mistake of treating its own contribution as the exclusive means of salvation for all mankind, and its own history as the only or even principal revelation of God.

Since salvation is to signify for us the maximum of human life, collective and individual, achievable on earth, the term "makes for" must have reference to the maximum utilization of human capacity, actual and potential. The purpose of all organization is to make such utilization possible. On the other hand that purpose is also defeated by organization when it leaves no room for freedom and spontaneity, or when it becomes fixed. Thus arises the problem of maintaining an equilibrium between law and freedom fixity and mobility. The power that makes for salvation is therefore to be identified neither with law alone nor with freedom alone but with equilibrium

between the two.

As to the value of introspection as a means of revealing inner experiences that may be regarded as reality and not as illusion, Prof. Judd makes the following statement (quoted by E. W. Lyman in The Meaning and Truth of Religion, p.352) "In the sphere of feelings, where we experience likes and dislikes, in the world of dreams, and in the play of fancy, we find that introspection is the only method which we can employ to reveal the inner happenings of the individual life...Introspection gives us an indispensable body of data which are necessary for the complete study and understanding of human life...In every normal human being there is an inner world of ideas and of recognitions of values, for which inner world there is no counterpart in the world studied by the physicists or in life below the human level."

Selfhood or the inner psychical unity which is the object of this introspection, is described by Bergson as follows: "Besides the body which is confined to the present moment in time, and limited to the place it occupies in space, which behaves automatically and reacts mechanically to external influences, we apprehend something which is more extended than the body in space, and which endures through time, something which requires from, or impses on, the body movements no longer automatic and foreseen, but unforseeable and free. This thing which overflows the body on all sides, and which creates acts by new-creating itself, is the 'I' 'soul' 'mind' /This is a reality/ "whose main purpose appears to be a ceaseless bringing of something new into the world." (quoted by Lyman, ibid. 360). Inges says (Idealism and Mysticsm, p. 26) "By 'revelation" I understand with Emerson the announcements of the soul, its manifestations of its own nature."

Lyman's statement (p.360) "Unless there is an inner unity and coherence in the self it would be impossible to discover any coherence or system of laws in the outer world," confirms what was said above about the dependence of our interpretation of the cosmos upon our interpretation of the self.

The philosophy of history is in essence the application to our social relationships of the category of inner unity and the distinctive powers of memory and anticipation which we experience in our selfhood. In that way experiences of others remote and space and time become our own, thereby enlarging the radius of our own being. Not only do we thus share the experiences of our contemporaries with whom we interact, but also those of our ancestors and others who lived in the past and of our descendants and others who will inhabit the earth in the future. This constitutes increment of personal life and is to that extent a very important element in the realization of the will to live the life abundant. Moreover it is not a passive enhancement but like all enhancement which is salvation it is originative and creative of further occasions for life. All this should make clear that the difference between a philosophy of history and a philosophy of nature from the standpoint of our belief in God is like the difference between a scientific explanation of fire and actually experiencing its heat and light instead of helping us would be discarded. Likewise any metaphysical theory which would interfere with our will to live or even with our will to maximum life may a priori be condemned as false. This applies to metaphysical theories that negate the reality of consciousness, the ego or soul or that deny any meaning to human history.

The outstanding metaphysical theory which interferes with the will to salvation is absolute determinism. That theory is the antithesis of the metaphyiscal reality of time and negates all creativity. This is in the main Spinozism. It not only rules out free will and moral

responsibility but the very notion of more than one predetermined series of possibilities in the way of life appointed to the individual or collective self. All history is an illusion, for reality exists from the standpoint of the absolute, according to this theory, at one point of time, i.e. sub specie aeternitatis. Hence the very striving for more life, and certainly for salvation is merely living out in oneself that which has been predetermined and could not be otherwise. The experience of striving, of moving from a state of non-being to being is one of those illusions which are the concommitants of our finite nature.

So long as this conclusion remains in the field of metaphysics its harmful effects upon the will to live the life abundant may not be perceptible. But as soon as it is treated seriously enough to be applied to our personal conduct and social relationships it is bound to undermine the entire structure of moral responsibility and social esthetic creativity. To pretend that in the interests of intellectual freedom we should actually be indifferent whether determinism is taken seriously or not is to forget the tremendous psychological effect of that belief in its religious form on the Mohammedan conquerors. It may well be that determinism can in some way be shown under certain circumstances to make for the enhancement of life and can even be reconciled with moral responsibility. Only if those who teach determinism can establish such connections can it be promulgated without dangerous consequences to salvation. By making the establishment of such connection a requirement would it be possible to reconcile the interests of intellectual freedom with what are ordinarily regarded as the interests of society.

Thus the essential fact in the nature of selfhood revealed by introspection is creativity, popularly experienced as freedom of the will. Unless we trust this revelation and use it as criterion of what else we learn about reality, instead of abandoning it, or looking else-

where for verification of it, we shall not make much headway with our will to salvation. It is only natural that, in the past, when all inner experiences were viewed as facts communicated by an external source and referred to the external world, the experience of creativity should be translated into the notion of God as the creator of the world out of nothing. The medieval theologians were at great pains to emphasize the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, and declared its antithesis, the belief in the existence of eternal matter, or hyle as Aristotle had taught, a cardinal heresy. In the light thrown my modern physics on the nature of matter, the entire issue is either meaningless or irrelevant. Matter is no longer conceived as inherently inert and as continuing in a given state of rest or motion unless acted upon mechanically by other matter. Instead it is viewed as a form of energy. In addition there is the theory of panpsychism, according to which mental energy (i.e. sensitivity and spontaneity) is conceived as co-present with all forms of material energy. Accordingly the main locus for creatio ex nihilo to make a difference in a person's life is in his own self. If the self is in a position to originate action independely of heredity and environment, if thought and evaluation that arise from the will to live or the will to salvation can be free to create some attitude, feeling, appreciation, work of art, or not to create any of these things, then we have the ontological fact of creativity which form the standpoint of the self takes the form of moral responsibility and from the standpoint of the Power that makes for salvation reveals that Power as creator.

It goes without saying that the creativity or the freedom of the self is far from being absolute. It is limited in that it can be enacted only within the particular setting in which the self exists. It cannot create an absolutely new world or environment of its own. This means that it is conditioned, which is a different thing from

being determined. Being conditioned means being limited to a particularity setting, but it does not preclude a certain range of contingency and alternatives of action even in that setting. It is within that range of contingency that the self can function freely or creatively. That functioning affords a sufficiently broad base for the development of moral personality with all that is distinctive to it, and for the enactment on a collective scale of meaningful history. Each free or creative act is not only itself a fulfillment of the will to life abundant, but opens up new opportunities and widens the range of contingency through which the self might attain greater intensity of living. This is what we mean by spiritual growth.

As a matter of fact the main trouble with human life is that it is entirely too passive too much dominated by the factors of determinism and that it does not exert sufficiently its creative energies. It allows the inertia of habit, tradition, prejudice, to say nothing of the biological instincts to get the better of it. The dialectic process which Marx discerns in history is anything but a conscious free expression of the human mind. It is a mechanical necessary process which has hitherto been allowed to take place just because man did not approach the social relationships with the powers of understanding and insight. Accordingly Marx proposes that men shall know what has led them to do what they did and to think the way they did and to think the way they did in order that they shall henceforth free themselves of the necessity or deterministic trend in their lives and become masters of their fate. That would bring about a classless society and one in which all talents would have the maximum outlet and life abundant placed within reach of all. But while Marx undoubtedly opened up new vistas to our comprehension of social forces he cannot be regarded as having said the last word concerning what makes for the achievement of the maximum life within man's reach. There are many factors in human

nature which he overlooked. In his zeal to destroy the evils of laissez faire he overlooked the tyranny of organized society and the greed for power in man's makeup. Other methods than that of utilizing the class struggle to achieve classless society have been suggested. But they call for more creative ability on the part of the masses than the simple plans advocated by the totalitarian philosophies which are sweeping over the world today. But if mankind is to be saved from annihilation it will have to exert creativity in ordering its life beyond anything it has known hitherto.

The foregoing are the lines along which a philosophy of history will have to ~~be~~ be written, lines which indicate that the only meaning to history is to be found in the increase of creativity which men exert in the ordering of their lives, as individuals and as groups. Such increase is measured by the extent to which human beings can emancipate themselves from the blind drive of their biological tendencies and social heredities and can master them instead of being mastered by them. Anyone who on the whole can see human history as having followed that trend hitherto to some extent at least and can have faith that this measure of creativity will be augmented in the future can subscribe to the following by Charles A. Beard (quoted by Lyman, ibid. 454): "For myself I may say that as I look over the grand drama of history, I find (or seem to find) amid the apparent chaos and tragedy, evidence of law and plan and immense achievement of the human spirit in spite of disasters. I am convinced that the world is not a mere bog in which men and women trample themselves in the mire and die. Something magnificent is taking place here amid the cruelties and tragedies, and the supreme challenge to intelligence is that of making the noblest and best in our curious heritage prevail."

The philosophy of history is necessary not on y to furnish us with a larger canvass for the realization of what is meant by creativity both human and divine, but is necessary also to correct the mistake with regard to creativity which we are likely to make when the only source of our knowledge of it is our inner experience. That mistake is to imagine that creativity is a sudden decision of the will, and comes about as a result of fiat. Instead we learn from history that creativity is a process of grwoth. It is interesting to find that this lesson is adumbrated by the earliest philosophy of history, despite probably the intention of its formulators. For what else does the entire panorama as unfolded in the Bible convey, if not the fact that not even the divine fiat succeeded but that God himself has had to resort to the process of growth for the accomplishment of his purpose? God created a world by fiat, only to find the world recalcitrant, and that he had to resort to the method of educating a people to obey His laws. That is the method of growth.

The method of growth versus the method of fiat implies not only that creativity does not take place in great laps. It implies that the limiting conditions cannot be ignored in the process of creation, but must themselves be changed as part of that process. The acceleration in the growth of mankind began to take place as soon as man began to manipulate the forces of external nature. That enabled him to change the limiting conditions under which his life had existed for ages. But a further step will have to be taken. The limiting conditions of physical and social heredity are far more serious than those of external nature. It is these that man will have to learn to master as the next step in his growth.

¶The foregoing two paragraphs have been suggested by Lyman's apt statement "God works not by the method of fiat but by the method of growth" (ibid. p. 408).

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Thursday, August 8, 1940

Karl Marx's interpretation of history as a dialectic which results from the development which takes place in the method of economic production is in a sense a criticism of human society. His interpretation implies that 1) society is not governed by any plan or purpose which takes into account what constitutes salvation or life abundant. Since the human being can plan he ought to plan; and 2) permitting itself to be planless, society is thrust from one extreme to the other by the inherent force of reality which is polar in character. The very assumption of Marx that reality oscillates between thesis and antithesis and finally ends up in synthesis until the latter develops a new antithesis implies the tendency of reality to seek out its equilibrium. This equilibrium which should be conceived as dynamic might as well be secured by short dialectic waves, so to speak, instead of the huge waves which cause social cataclysms. In other words, if human society would make growth and evolution its method of life and creativity, it would save itself the many tragedies which follow in the wake of violent revolutions.

There are two concepts which would take on more specific and richer meaning if their relation to the will to live the maximum life were made more apparent. Those are the concepts "value" and personality" "Value" has generally been associated with man's moral strivings and frustrations. But it has come to include also esthetic experience. The evaluation of experience in terms of the good and the beautiful is crystallized in a number of "values." "Truth" is not a third category but may be viewed as a phase of either goodness or beauty, or as a synthesis of the two. Viewed thus, they give rise to the question whether loyalty to them is supported by the existential world. If the existential world, despite all the evil, cruelty, ugliness and

falsehood favors sanctions or validates the values, then it is assumed one can afford to be devoted to them no matter at what cost. Then follow the attempts to discover God in the existential world, in nature and in society. And the opinions differ according as they are those of optimists or pessimists. One can not help feeling a certain air of unreality about the entire procedure. The basis for this feeling is that the very process of evaluation hangs in the air, and is not rooted in anything real or vital.

All this is transformed, if we recognize that the fundamental fact around which everything we think do or feel must revolve is the will to live, and that man by virtue of his ability to objectify that will, raises it to the will to live the maximum possible. Man is the most life-hungry of all creatures and never knows when he has enough life. It is not quantity alone that counts with him but also quality. He doesn't just go through life as do other living beings, but he also goes around it and smells it and paws it and plays with it and is both frightened and elated by it as though it were a skein and he were a kitten. Out of this multifarious handling of it arise the various moral and esthetic values. Good is that which makes for more and better life, beautiful is that which gets the most of life out of or sees the most in any actual living moment. Suppose we strike a snag and find that there is not enough of either quantity or quality of life to satisfy our voracious appetite for it, suppose, in plain words, we find that men are cruel and unjust and hypocritical, should we say: "I must make sure that the existential world supports the values by which I express what I think of certain conduct and of certain phases of reality from the standpoint of their increasing or diminishing the measure and richness of life"? It seems to me such a demand is nonsensical. Will the leer on the face of a fawning hypocrite cease to be ugly even if I can't prove logically the existence of a God who detests hypocrites?

Will the betrayal of a friend, will lying and cheating and breaking the plighted word be less damnable, if I am not sufficiently keen minded to understand the principle of metaphysical unpredictability which allows for freedom of the will and of panpsychism which introduces godhood into the grain of sand?

This does not mean that one has to go to the other extreme and assume that these evaluations are ultimate. On the contrary, that too is unrealistic. As evaluations they are meaningless apart from the will to live the life abundant, and are understandable only as indices of what is more life and what is less life. Not that good means good for life. No, the good means life is life. The evil is death and not merely a means to it. Likewise with the beautiful and the ugly. If we grasp the full significance of the fact that values are merely measures of the quantity andquality of life which certain conduct or situations afford us, then their function is evidently to stimulate and to guide us in the attainment of maximum life. As such they are an integral part of our insatiable hunger for life. Like all specific hungers there must be something in the existential world to satisfy it. So it is reasonable to assume that man's insatiable hunger must have something in the existential world corresponding to it. The only reality that can satisfy an insatiable hunger for life is infinite life. This is exactly what we meanby God. However unfeeling and cold and disdainful the existential world and human society may be of all that we value, if there is in us sufficient elan vital, sufficient nisus, urge or drive, we shall continue believing in God. But if we are like dying embers, with life glimmering weakly in our innermost souls no matter how logical the arguments to prove the reality of God, they can call forth no response. Thus in the last resort believing in God is having the human will to live. Is this human will to live or the will to salvation a gift, or as the theologians used to say, bestwood by divine grace, or

can it be willed, can it come to those who do not possess it but would like to possess it? It seems that to man is given the chance to be what he is not, by dint of his capacity to grow. Creativity is a human prerogative.

At first sight it may seem that while believing in God is having the human will to live, the reverse is not always true. O(Neill or Jeffers or Hardy or Job and Koheleth who have depicted the human tragedy of moral frustration and have written life down as a meaningless phantasmogoria are certainly vital personalities with a keen sense of values by reason of their extraordinary genius in evaluating experience from the standpoint of an appetite and zest for life which they possess. And yet they deny the existence of God. There is no one explanation that can fit all of them. In some cases it may be that the God they deny is merely the conventional one of the populace that live their lives with their brains half asleep. In other cases it may be that despite their intuitive discovery of the hollowness of the conventional notion of God, they have been unable to think their way through to a notion of their own.

Also the concept "personality" takes on concrete meaning, when viewed in relation to the human will to live or the will to salvation. The term "personality" has been defined in dozens of ways. Allport in his book of that name enumerates about fifty. The particular sense in which the term is discussed here is the ~~xxxx~~ (p.233?)
moral and spiritual one, that sense in which it is made synonimous with soul and treated as sacred. That is the sense too, in which its attainment is deemed the acme of human achievement and that which gives worth to society and its institutions. In reality it is the inner psychological product of successful striving for the life abundant or salvation. It is the consummation of the human differentia. Whereas "values" represents the significance of specific experiences from the standpoint of

their relation to the will to salvation, "personality" stresses the significance of that will itself. To the extent that the human being has such will, he has the capacity to be a "person," and to the extent that he has strived for salvation, he has personality. In thatsense personality is the image of God and the destiny of man.(see p. 242)

The close correlation between the belief in God and the will to salvation may perhaps be expressed in the following: The will to salvation implies that what can be ought to be. The belief in God implies that what ought to be can be.

The principle that what can be ought to be serves Guyan in his "Morality Without Sanctions" as the basis for his thesis that the various English and German ethical systems were wide of the mark, when they tried to base morality upon some sanction outside itself. According to him the mere fact that we can do things that are of benefit to our fellowmen carries with it its own imperative and gives us no rest until we carry it into effect. He mentions, e.g. the circumstances that men are moral not because there exist moral codes, but such codes exist because men are moral. His theory falls in line with the thesis advanced here that man's moral and spiritual life is the expression of his will to live the abundant life, for that will presupposes latent potentialities. Potentiality that is directed toward life, or lifeward should be actualized. This is another form of saying what can be (in the direction of adding to the quantity and quality of life) should be. It is the only kind of potentiality or "can be" that is legitimate.

The counterpart of what can be ought to be, namely, what ought to be can be, which is an affirmation of godhood in the existential order cannot be proved as an independent fact. Its validity is only as counterpart, and not as an independent truth. But as such it expresses the potential reality of the ought. It does not affirm its absolute necessity. This is what we would expect to be the case, since inevitability would deprive the ought of the element of freedom or contingency without which it becomes an "is."

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Friday, August 9, 1940

One very important corollary of the soteric approach is that it gives primacy to action and treats thought as instrumental. The significance of this corollary becomes specially evident when dealing with the problem of evil. Ever since man has become conscious of his will to salvation he has wrestled with that problem, only to find his antagonist as agile and unwearied as ever. From the standpoint of the will to live, evil is the very occasion for the exercise of that will, the evil of death or of whatever leads to it. This is not an intellectual argument to justify the existence of evil but merely the description of an indubitable fact beyond which it is impossible for the human mind to proceed. Intellectually the will to live is no less, if not more, of a mystery than the evil which that will seeks to overcome. Hence the primary and normal reaction to evil should not be to try to account for it, least of all to try to explain it away, but to destroy or transform it. Only secondarily should we theorize about it, when it is so potent that it defies our power to destroy or transform it which means that it threatens to destroy or transform us. Then there is this value to interpreting it: Interpretation either makes it possible for us to go on with our efforts to destroy or transform the evil or it neutralizes the power of evil to destroy us. In the latter case we transcend the evil which we cannot transform.

But interpretation of evil, to have either of the foregoing two effects, must be genuine. It is not genuine if it tries to prove that evil is an illusion or a necessary means to good. It is genuine when it tends to point out that evil is an integral part of the mystery of life, beyond the power of man to account for. The best thing to do is to fight against it, if we can, for in such fight we are doing God's work, or God is working through us. Here is where <u>can</u> is <u>ought</u>.

And if we cannot fight against evil we should accept it, not in a spirit of blind resignation but make it part of life. When one is resigned to evil, nothing happens to it. When however it is made part of life, i.e. treated as that chaos which is the very occasion for creating it, it is somehow metamorphosed. This is actually the testimony of those who can reckon with evil in that spirit, as may be seen from the following by Katherine Mansfield: /a gifted author who died in 1922 at the age of 34, after a long struggle with disease: "I should like this to be accepted as my confession. There is no limit to human suffering. When one thinks: 'Now I have touched the bottom of the sea -- now I can go no dedper,' one does go deeper...I do not want to die without leaving a record of my belief that suffering can be overcome. For I do believe it. What must one do?...Do not resist. Take it. Be overwhelmed. Accept it fully. Make it <u>part</u> of life. Everything in life that we really accept undergoes a change. So suffering must become Love. This is the mystery. This is what I must do. I must pass from personal love to greater love" (from her <u>Journal</u>, quoted by Lyman, ibid. p. 412). Note the statement"Be overwhelmed." This indicates at once between her kind of acceptance and the acceptance in a spirit of resignation. She advises not stoic hardness but a religious love, a kind of self-identification with God in His struggle against chaos. This is borne out by what she says later "Suffering must become Love."

Of course only those of saintly disposition, those in whom God functions to a far greater degree than He does through most people can transcend the evil against which the average person finds himself powerless. This does not mean that the average person is exempt from the obligation of trying to develop at least an appreciation for such transcendence and an understanding of what it implies with regard to God and the nature of evil. This brings up the entire question as to the place of spiritual genius in soterics or the soteric approach to

religion. Here again we note the advantage of that approach over the purely intellectual one. The men and women of more than average power of intelligence, creative ability, justice, courage, love, reveal possibilities of human nature and actually open up new areas for the human plus to actualize itself. The vague hunger for more and better life in most of us is shown as functioning concretely in these people of spiritual genius. Their lives are the best argument for the reality of godhood and the most powerful refutation of atheism and cynicism. From the soteric standpoint, educationally there is greater value to becoming intimately acquainted with the lives of heroes of the spirit than to abstract reasoning concerning the problem of salvation. There is something significant in the very fact that nothing so touches us to the quick as witnessing or even learning about the struggles of these heroic souls against danger, difficulty or temptation. There must be in us a modicum of that same spirit as theirs, which responds so readily to the manifestation of that spirit. Without an intimate knowledge of heroic living the study of soterics would be like the study of botany from a textbook without any kind of fieldwork.

Whenever any one is in doubt concerning the reality of the Power that makes for salvation, he will have his doubts dispelled much more by the following statement from Earl of Shaftesbury's journal (quoted by Lyman, ibid. 410) than by any abstract theorizing: "Twelve years of labor, anxiety and responsibility! I have borrowed and spent in reference to my income enormous sums of money, and am shut out from every hope of emolument and path of honorable ambition. My own kinsfolk dislike my opinions and persecute me. I am excluded from my father's house because I have maintained the cause of the laborer. It has been toil by day and by night, fears and disappointments, prayers and tears, long journeys and unceasing letters." The statement with which Lyman (ibid) follows up that entry of Shaftesbury's weakens rather

reenforces the case for the revelation of the divine spirit. "But Shaftesbury's pain and struggle bore their fruit," says Lyman, "and at the xxxx time of his death it could be said that all the great social reforms of his generation were due more to his influence, character and perseverance than to any other single cause." Even if they hadn't borne fruit, nothing would have detracted from the worth and significance of his "character and perseverance." While it is true that when we say "makes for salvation" we refer to the general improvement of human life, the primary meaning of that phrase must refer to the person that by his "character and perseverance" incarnates that Power. That very "character and perseverance" are life abundant, optimum life. Whatever emanates from that optimum life is all to the good and a further evidence of the working in human life of the Power that makes for salvation. But the initial manifestation of that Power is the abundant life lived by the spiritual hero.

One does not even have to resort to the lives of spiritual geniuses. The lives of men and women who by self-discipline have made more of their lives than what their heredity and environment might have led one to predict are equally heartening and equally convincing as evidence of the Power that makes for salvation. In concluding her "This Is My Story" Eleanor Roosevelt says: "From the time of my marriage, the life I lived seemed more closely allied with the life that all of us know today [1937]. It was colorful, active and interesting. The lessons learned were those of adaptability and adjustment and finally of self-reliance and the developing into an individual which every human being must eventually do" (p. 364). Those lessons which she learned from experiences that were at times far from happy are lessons in the art of life. Adaptability, self-reliance and individuality, what are they if not indices of greater quantity and quality of life attained. No salvation is conceivable without them, and they might in themselves constitute highly important elements in the good life, the life worthwhile or salvation.

Saturday, August 10, 1940

In traditional religion the principle of reward and punishment was accounted a cardinal one. The denial of it was tantamount to the denial of the existence of God. (In fact the three cardinal principles, the existence of God, divine self-revelation in the way of life and retribution correspond respectively to the three parts of the soteric principle 1) the existence of a Power, 2) that makes for 3)salvation.) With the principle of retribution apparently violated in this world, it was deemed necessary to posit the existence of another world in which the inequities of this life were made good. When the sanction of other worldly retribution ceased to be regarded as tenable, various attempts were made to build up a system of ethics, independently of the principle of retribution. With what little success these attempts have met is pointed out by Sedgwick in his Methods of Ethics (If I remember aright) the point he makes is that the sanction of reward and punishment is an inevitable one, and since that sanction is unrealizable in this world we must assume its operation in another world.

In view, however, of the universalization of war in the meantime, we do not have to resort to other worldly sanctions, when we have one so dreadful and so certain in its working in this world. Mankind has come to a point, thanks to its mechanical inventions and rapid transit and communication, where the result of unethical conduct in society is international war on a totalitarian scale. Greed, exploitation and oppression produce a state of affairs from which there is no escape but war. War nowadays casts its shadow of terror long ahead of the event and darkens human life everywhere long after the event and is a veritable hell to all the world during the event. War is the breakdown of everything that spells salvation. It presupposes the lack for millions of the opportunity to carry on a vocation. It implies the maiming and killing of the best of human progeny; it either

drains off man's excess functioning into channels of destruction or causes it to turn into mental poison.

The trouble with our idea of war is that we imagine it is a dreadful calamity of nature, which has as little to do with the day-to-day mode of life as a tornado or an earthquake. But being a human institution it is regarded as nevertheless within human control, and so we have idealists who call themselves pacifists and conscientious objectors who either in organized or in unorganized fashion would like to put an end to war. Or we have other idealists who believe that it is possible to have a final Armageddon to end all war. These idealistic notions about war are as rational as would have been formerly the determination to destroy Gehinnon or Hell, or of youngsters conscientiously objecting to being spanked. All these idealists forget that international war is the inevitable cumulative effect of the private wars that go on continually between one business man and another, between capital and labor, among labor unions and among business trusts and between one laborer and another. The enrgy and the mentality that human beings waste in trying to get the better of one another or to outdo one another leave them none to find ways and means to deal with the growing complexities of employment and security. The easiest solution when there is internal crises in any country as a result of the mutual strife among its citizens is for all the citizens to unite in war upon another country. There is little chance for any one to achieve salvation during the intervals of peace and certainly less while the war is on. The most lurid Dantesque imagination could not envisage the kind of a hell war has turned out to be. But if war is ever to be abolished, it can be done so only by way of the soteric mode of life become universal.

To adopt the soteric approach to life means learning to regard the practice of decency in our human relationships as indispensable as we have come to regard literacy. Like literacy, the practice of decency would have to become not only the avowed but the actual aim of the home the school and the church. There is no greater delusion than the belief that these three pillars of human society are devoted to the inculcation of the art of living together or the practice of the fundamental decencies that should obtain in our human relationships. The truth is that they have been devoted chiefly to the inculcation of the ideal of getting ahead of our fellows, as though we were a lot of race horses whose only utility is to outrun the next one. But if ever the home, the school and the church would seriously undertake the teaching of the good life and aim to place salvation within reach of all, they would have to resort to the accounts of the tragedies of modern war as a deterrent of the evil men do. The objective for the efforts of the pacifist and the conscious objector is the private war which goes on relentlessly all the time and the institutions to which they should direct their attention to put an end to private war should not be government, but the home, the school and the church. If we have to deal with government as the agency to put an end to private war, the private war has already gone too far to be checked. If government has to intervene, the peace that it imposes is an enforced and therefore an external peace. What human salvation demands is the cessation of war as a result of an inner love of peace. That can come only as a result of education. For that reason the home, the school and the church are the only agencies that can, if properly directed, put an end to our private wars.

Thus, by however roundabout a fashion we come back to the individual as the source of responsibility and of hope that mankind would finally learn the meaning and the way of salvation. We know too well the argument which the individual usually advances: "What can I do to

improve matters?" he says, "how can my greatest exertions in behalf of what I know ought to be make the slightest dent upon the intricate mass of corruption and perversity?" This self-exemption from any responsibility for the existing state of private warfare comes with ill grace from the individual. The individual is the beneficiary of whatever goods have accrued to mankind from the wisdom, courage, kindness and cooperation that have managed to survive the state of perpetual warfare. The fact that as an individual his contribution toward the wealth of human values can at best be but puny compared with that which he finds ready to hand does not deter him from drawing upon them. He does not say: What have I done personally to deserve to be heir to all this wealth? He is not particular about benefitting from so much for which he has done nothing to amass or achieve. Why then should he be so particular about making sure that whatever efforts he exerts to undo the world of evils have an evident effect, otherwise he would not think it worthwhile to exert them? It is only fair that in exchange for so much he has not earned he give society something which does not bring him the evident reward of effectiveness. Only from the acceptance by the individual of this responsibility for putting an end to the perpetual strife of private warfare will there emerge plans of social reform that will not have to depend upon large scale extraneous force for their being carried through nor run the danger of being so beuraurocratized is to bring on worse evils than those against which they were directed.

All the foregoing which is based on the view of international war as a sanction for living the good life apparently contradicts the thesis that the soteric approach does away with the need of sanctions, because that approach regards the good life as the life abundant and therefore its own justification. This contradiction, however, is resolved when we realize that there is a distinction between viewing the life abundant from within which is possible only to the individual

studying introspectively his "total self in its unanalyzible unity," and viewing the life abundant externally as a fact of human society. In the former case sanctions are superfluous;in the latter there is no way of telling what the life abundant means, unless we identify some desirable state of existence in this world or in the next as that kind of life and some state of existence either in this world or the next as the frustration of that life.

A fundamental question which calls for an answer is the following: Can the introspective contemplation of our "total self in its unanalyzable unity" afford us reliable guidance as to what should constitute for us maximum life or the life abundant? Can we through that kind of contemplation arrive at an objectively true conception of salvation?

The soteric approach to religion is based on the assumption that the central interest in religion is not the conception of God but what constitutes salvation and the way to attain it. On that assumption all that the various religions hitherto have been chiefly trying to articulate is the meaning of salvation. On the further assumption that what the various religions have been trying to articulate has come from introspective contemplation and not from any supernatural revelation, they should have been able to offer better guidance with regard to salvation than they have done. They all agree that the answer to the problem of salvation turns upon a fundamental dualism, an evil to be averted and a good to be attained. But what that dualism is has been defined in various ways, none of which has been altogether helpful, if at all. Here are some of the pairs of evil and good as the various religions and philosophies of religion have stated them: matter vs. spirit, body vs. soul, death vs. immortality, natural vs. supernatural, finite vs. infinite, this world vs. the next world. If they do not help us to

achieve salvation it must be because they represent untrue dichotomies of reality. Are we then to conclude that we cannot rely on introspective contemplation of our inner life?

There is one important consideration which prevents us from accepting this conclusion. It is this: Whatever the introspective contemplation engaged in, it was vitiated from the very start by the fact that the self which was contemplated was not permitted to remain in its "unanalyzable unity ," but was broken up at once into abstract concepts, like body and soul, matter and spirit, temporal and eternal, natural and supernatural, finite and infinite. As an "unanalyzable unity" the outstanding fact about the self which should have been noted at once is that it is nothing if not a synthesis of each of the two pairs of concepts. That would at once have pointed to the true nature of salvation as consisting in fulfilling the double character of the soul, and taking care not to break up that synthesis by emphasizing one side at the expense of the other. It is only thus that introspection would have resulted in what E. W. Lyman pleads for (p.422), namely, the realization that the only true dualism is the ethical dualism "between right and wrong, loyalty to truth and acceptance of untruth, love and its opposites of cruelty, callousness, greed and hate."

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Sunday, August 11, 1940

A very important corollary which derives from the emphasis upon the "unanalyzable unity" of the self as the source of our ethical and religious intuitions has a bearing on the relation of God to natural evil and on the question of God's finitude. The self in its unity embraces both its actualities and possibilities. Ontologically neither is conceivable without the other. But the process of ratiocination breaks up this unity into a duality. The desirable possibilities of the self are separated out more and more from the actualities

of the self and are hypostatized into the ideal self. The realization of it is considered salvation. The Power that makes for salvation thus conceived is likewise separated out of the actual world, and He in turn becomes the hypostatization of all the possible perfections to the nth degree. He is infinite power, i.e. omnipotent and omniscient; He is infinite goodness, i.e. perfect.

Then the question arises: If He is infinite in power and goodness, why does He suffer so much natural evil to exist? To this day there has not come a genuinely satisfying explanation. All the theodocies are stilted and artificial. They only accentuate the incongruity of a world in which there is so much suffering and mutual slaughter of living things with the conception of all powerful God who would have to possess a mere modicum of goodness to eliminate all that unnecessary evil. The main purpose of religion is to get us to love God and to worship Him. How can we possibly find it in our hearts to love and worship a God who having the power to eliminate so much useless agony, does not do so? The further we get away from traditional religion which paid very little attention to the claims of rationality and simply bid us suppress them, the less likely will it be possible for love and worship of God to figure in our lives, if we shall insist that only an omnipotent God is God, and that He is the author of the evil in the world as well as the good. This in the main is why we are religiously disoriented nowadays.

But the truth is that we want a God whom we can love with all our being and worship with all our soul. To satisfy this yearning we should desist from the fatal tendency to break up the "unanalyzable unity of the self." We would then realize that within the ambit of that unity there asserts itself a polarity of antitheses, of body and spirit, of good and evil, of a will to live and of inherent negation to it. The mystery of good and evil is right there. It is an ultimate which

have to accept. But if we want to accept it in a manner that is in keeping with the will to live the maximum life, we instinctively look beyond the self and become aware of a cosmic Power that is continuous with our own self and with which we in turn are continuous. It is not a perceptual or conceptual awareness, i.e. neither an object of the senses nor the result of abstract ratiocination. It is an immediate and intuitive awareness. If we have the intellectual or spiritual courage to trust this intuitive awareness, we find ourselves loving and worshipping a God who is the Power that makes for our salvation. All that we want to be sure of concerning this Power is that He is not a subjective illusion but an ontological reality of cosmic dimensions. This Power may be engaged on a cosmic scale in combatting chaos and evil, not as one God combats another -- for there is no other God -- but as we combat the evil in ourselves. We are not two beings but one despite our combating evil in ourselves. If we do all we can to combat our inner moral evil and fail because of inherited urges which are really too strong for us, we really are morally guiltless. This means that if we go to the limit of our powers to combat evil, only natural evil remains. All that we need ascribe to the cosmic process that makes for our salvation is that it goes to the limit of its power in overcoming evil, not that it is omnipotent and could entirely destroy the evil. The evil which thus successfully resists God is not outside God but part of His own being and a limitation of it which He seeks to destroy and would destroy if He could. God is not infinite except in time, and it may be that in course of vast eons this natural evil will be overcome, though there probably will arise new evil in its place. Why there should be evil or death is, from this point of view, as rational a question as why 2+2 make 4 and not 5. The main point, however, is that despite the limitation in God's nature from an absolute standpoint, He is more than sufficiently potent to aid us in our efforts to attain salvation,

if we comply with the laws of nature, mind and society whereby this power manifests itself to us human beings. It is more important from the standpoint of salvation that we learn to identify God with the actually experienced facts of creativity and unity than with the attribute of absolute perfection which is based only on inference from gratuitous assumptions.

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Monday, August 12, 1940

The following from W. R. Inge in Personal Idealism and Mysticism (p.2) confirms the central thesis of my approach: "Our religion must be based upon our own experience, and it ought to be so. Although God's thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor His ways as our ways, we are made in His image, and no higher category than our own rational and spiritual life is open to us in which we could place Him....But what are 'we'? Man is a microcosm, with affinities to every grade of God's creation. He is a little lower than the angels, and a little higher than the brutes...Everyone of us in his short span of life, recapitulates and hurries through the whole gamut of creation. In the nine months before we see the light we pass through stages of evolution which in the race were spread over tens of millions of years. And in our upward progress may there not be some dim anticipation of another long period of grwoth, which the slow mills of God are grinding out without haste and without rest?"

On p. 5 he says: "The organ by which we apprehend divine truth is no special faculty, but the higher reason, which we distinguish from the understanding because we mean to include the will and feelings, disciplined under the guidance of the intellect. The higher reason is that unification of our personality which is the goal of our striving and the postulate of all our rational life. God is the last object to be clearly known, precisely because He is ~~kkkk~~ at once the

presupposition and foundation and consummation of all our knowledge."

The category of "intelligence" which is one of the principal factors for salvation should be understood as the apprehension and application of the means-ends relationship within the principles of (p.241) (order) and (limitation). These principles were identified by Plotinius as those which we learn "from the study of nature and the practice of social virtues."

The self as an "unanalyzable unity" should not be confused with the notion of personality as "a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious to other selves -- impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue" (Pringle Pattison, quoted by Inge, Personal Idealism and Mysticism,(p. 94). This conception of personality stems from Leibvitz and is developed by Lotze). The unity of the self is here posited against its divisibility into intellect, feeling and will but not against its continuity either with other selves or with a larger self. On the contrary individual selfhood is as unthinkable without either social or divine selfhood, as the holes of a net are unthinkable without the criss crossing of the cords out of which the net is woven. This is why when we contemplate this selfhood, we discern in its nature, society and God. To the extent that we experience the resolution of selfhood, into these three elements we achieve selfhood. This paradox has been sensed both in Jewish and in Christian teaching to the effect that we find ourselves by losing ourselves. Inge is right in maintaining that the emphasis upon personality as impervious is neither ethically nor metaphysically tenable.

It seems to me that Henry Nelson Wieman has done more clear and constructive thinking on the subject of religion than any of the writers whose works on the subject of religion or the idea of God I have read. His approach to the problem is straightforward and realistic and is not vitiated by hypostases like those in which most writers on the subject of religion involve themselves. He doesn't make religion the subject of statements and affirmations. When he speaks of God one knows exactly what he means by that term. The definition in which that meaning is set forth is a gem for clarity and is at once framed in an argument for the reality of God, which in simplicity and truth excels all the classic argument ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ of ~~xxxxxxx~~ theology. Here it is: "Whatever else the word God may mean, it is a term used to designate that Something upon which human life is most dependent for its security, welfare and increasing abundance. That there is such a Something cannot be doubted. The mere fact that human life happens, and continues to happen, proves that this Something, however unknown, does certainly exist" (Religious Experience and Scientific Method, p.9).

From the foregoing it is evident how near Wieman comes defining God as the Power that makes for salvation, for what else are security, welfare and increasing abundance (of human life)? In the first chapter of that book he makes three points. First, he insists that our knowledge of God comes to us in the same way as all other knowledge, i.e. by way of a datum of experience (uninterpreted) which is then interpreted and not as a direct and immediate intuition unlike all other knowledge. Secondly he makes a distinction between knowledgr by acquaintance and knowledge by description(which he uses somewhat differently from the sense in which they are employed by William James) and emphasizes the fact that our knowledge of God is knowledge by acquaintance. By that he negates a theory like that of Hermann Cohen

(whom he does not mention) who regards God and the God idea as synonimous, because God, to Cohen, is the logical ground of reason, a logical entity and not an object of experience. God is to Wieman very definitely "an object that enters into our immediate awareness" and not merely known "through the logical consistency of propositions." He is not "purely a system of concepts." Thirdly, he samples religious experience. One is a quotation from Rufus Jones which tells of a man who experienced God just after the physician had told him that he was the victim of a disease that would make him deaf and blind and impair his memory. The other is from Geo. A. Coe which describes the experiences of survivors of the Titanic disaster and which records William James' reaction to the San Francisco earthquake. Then he adds instances taken from normal life.

His first two points are very important and should prove very fruitful. But in his third point he goes off on a tangent. He is led to make that point because he fails to realize what is implied in his general assumption that "the most common human appeal to God is in the hour of bewilderment, when the individual (and often the group) feels baffled and defeated." (ibid. p. 34). He does not probe sufficiently into the very experience which he considers as the datum to be analyzed and studied. He should have noted forthwith that the most common appeal to God is synchronous with the functioning of the self-assertion of the will to live. He would then have filled out in the very data he quotes the element that is missing in all of them, due to the fact that those who reported those data had turned the conventional blind spot on the most important element in them -- the will to live. Thus the friend of Rufus Jones whose doctor had told him of what awaited him felt an onrush of the will to live. It was that will which said nay to the doctor's diagnosis and enabled him to see the years ahead of him in a new perspective, which as Jones puts it, "turned his primary tendency to

despair into steady consciousness of hope and joy."

The same is true of the other instances quoted by Wieman. We can well understand why the Titanic survivors should feel as Stanton Cort puts it: "We were all one, not only with one another, but with the cosmic being that for the time had seemed so cruel." They had but a short time before faced death together. Could the sense of what it means to be alive be keener than at such a moment. To be thus rescued from certain death is bound to give the will to live a heightened intensity by very reason of its completely unexpected fulfillment. So deep is the joy at that moment that the cruely which the "cosmic being" had displayed is forgiven. We have not here not only a typical datum of religious experience, but also a typical example of how religious experiences manage without the aid of any metaphysical theodicies to digest, so to speak, the evils of nature which seem to negate the existence of the Power that makes for the fulfillment of man's will to live.

By the same token the other data of religious experience during crises mentioned by Wieman all illustrate how the will to live is activated. "A business crash where one's business career is apparently ruined, or disappointment in love, or an accident which causes one to give up his chosen calling in life, or the death of some beloved who was the center of one's life" -- in all these cases there is a tug of war between suicidal tendencies and the will to live. If the will to live manages to come out not maimed but triumphant, it could not very well avoid intimating the presence of a Power that bolsters it up.

The case of William James reaction to the earthquake, it seems to me, is irrelevant. Whether that experience was felt as a vicious demoniacal power or of some other "individualized thing has nothing whatever to do with religion, and is therefore not a datum for

knowledge of God. Such a datum is only the sense of fright and the relief from it. To call the sense of "an individualized thing" a datum of religious experience is to make the mistake of calling the cognitive misinterpretation of phenomena associated with occasions in which the will to live is aroused religious experiences. The belief in ghosts and spooks is not religious experience. Failing to realize that fact, most of the anthropologists have drawn some very erroneous conclusions from what they observed among primitive peoples.

The best proof that it is the activation of the will to live that is the crucial element in the datum of religious experience is the fact that Wieman himself practically retracts from what he said about crises as being the occasion of "most common human appeal to God." Thus he says: "Perhaps the most common experience of God, however, has nothing to do with such great crises as we have indicated." As a matter of fact he gives what appears to be the best description of the datum of religious experience in the following statement: "This state of diffusive awareness, where habitual systems of response are resolved into an undirected, unselective aliveness of the total organism to the total event then ensuing, comes softly in the quiet hour, unannounced and unrecorded.

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Tuesday, August 13, 1940

The method of soterical introspection differs radically from that of psychological introspection. In psychology the approach is scientific. This involves observing an event, whether inner or outer, in terms of space-time relations. For that purpose it is necessary to select out from the event whatever particular phase interests us and note the relation in which it stands to other events from the point of view of some space-time structure. We may thus study psychologically the particular glands and muscles and nerves that come into play when-

ever we become conscious of thoughts of a particular kind. In psychological introspection we engage in exactly the same process of analyzing the event and selecting from its vast complexity a single aspect as we do in the other sciences which study only outward events.

But in soteric introspection we pursue the very opposite method. We try to overcome our tendencies to analyze and abstract to which we have become subject as a result of sophistication, even when we are not engaged in scientific research. We try to steep ourselves into the one event to which we have the most immediate access -- the will tO live -- with all its concrete fullness. This involves the ability to experience the will to live in its totality, that is as embracing its past, present and future, as it is, as it might be and as it ought to be,under as many possible circumstances as we can contemplate. Psychological introspection is impersonal, soteric introspection is, in a sense, the extremely personal. Psychological introspection resembles the way in which a personnel manager gives a report of an applicant for a job. Soteric introspection resembles the way a mother gives a report of her child. The personnel manager is interested in the one aspect of the applicant -- his capacity to make good in the job for which he applies. The mother, however, is interested in the entire personality of her child, in his capacity for growth, for joy, for fullness of life, in his capacity for salvation.

In the mother's interest in her child's personality we have a criterion of the kind of introspection into our own personality -- or the will to live -- in which we must engage to derive from such introspective experience the data we need for ethical and religious interpretation and guidance. How it is possible for the human mind thus to divide itself as it were, and be at the same time both subject and object is probably one of the most difficult events to explain metaphysically.